Comparing environmental movement networks in periods of latency and visibility

The environmental movement is a network of organisations and individuals working for environmental improvement or the prevention of environmental degradation using institutional, semi- and non-institutional channels. This network consists of a variety of types of organisations that have a range of conservationist to radical strategies and beliefs, and are active from the very local level right up to the transnational level. The shape and form of this network, however, varies considerably from time to time. During ‘latent’ periods – temporary phases during which movement activity is invisible to the general public – movement organisations tend to become more isolated and local groups will be moribund or inclined to infighting, as ideological differences and differing fields of action prevent interaction. During ‘visible’ phases, during which movement activity is highly noticeable as a result of engagement in protest, the need to win a campaign may reduce ideological chasms and create denser networks of interaction. This paper demonstrates the stark differences between environmental movement networks at visible and latent times using data from surveys at two different points in time of the networks of environmental organisations in southeast London. During 2001, when the local community was fighting a proposal for a multiplex cinema to be built at Crystal Palace, the movement was relatively dense, and there was even evidence of networking between the most unlikely bedfellows of middle class residents’ associations and dreadlocked tree-dwellers. Two years later, when this campaign had been won, the movement had become much more fractured, and radical groups and residents’ associations had virtually disappeared from the network, burning the bridges they had created in the network as they evaporated. These differences are demonstrated using some basic social network analysis measures including network mapping.

1. Introduction

According to most definitions of social movements, networking is a key, if not defining, feature. The environmental movement, for example, is often cited as being a network of individuals and organisations with a concern to protect or enhance the environment, engaging in semi- or non-institutionalized forms of collective action (Diani 1995, Rootes 2001). This paper seeks to compare the dynamics of environmental movement networks between latent
and critical campaign times. During periods of latent movement activity, movement organisations are virtually invisible to the public eye. However, this does not signify a lack of movement activity, but rather involves much behind the scenes work, allegedly including ‘the daily production of alternative frameworks of meaning, on which networks themselves are founded and live from day to day … [and] potential resistance or opposition is sewn into the very fabric of life’ (Melucci 1989:70-1). Melucci implies that periods of latency strengthen networking potential. Even if this is so, it is clearly critical campaign times that bear witness to the manifestation of actual networking potential. A critical campaign time is deemed to be a period of time in which intensive campaigning is undertaken to attempt to prevent the imminent construction of an unwanted land use. Critical campaign times usually occur when the political opportunities offered by conventional campaign strategies have been exhausted and committed campaigners have little alternative but to support or engage in physical direct action.

Conventional political sociology suggests that the relatively closed electoral system in Britain is balanced by a relatively open administrative structure (Rootes 1992:171-192). Arguably, the relative openness of the government to representations by environmental organisations has impacted the shape and form of the wider movement. In his argument on British exceptionalism, Rootes (1992) for example, suggested that unconventional protest activity was lacking in the British environmental movement (as it was until just after the article was published) because the polity had accepted it. That the ‘opportunity structure’ in Britain has been quite open to moderate green groups since the 1980s is indeed widely recognised, being ‘sufficient for them [environmental organisations] to remain well-ordered and non-disruptive’ (Rawcliffe 1998:55), despite, in the main occupying a ‘more pragmatic threshold’ – balancing insider and outsider strategies according to the issue and the policy arena in question. As part of their quest to remain reputable in the eyes of the government, we would therefore expect moderate environmental organisations to be wary of alliances with radical environmental organisations that might tarnish their organisational image, or otherwise jeopardise their constructive links with governmental actors.

However, this political sociology approach assumes that the government is not only open to comments from environmental organisations, but also acts upon them. In practice, the relationship between environmental organisations and the government is not so cosy as this implies. Although the British polity is (at least relatively) ‘open’ to moderate (but not radical)
environmental organisations, this does not automatically guarantee success for moderate environmental organisations. Unfortunately, an open polity creates competition within the wider movement sector by increasing access for others. This can result in what Rauch (1995) and Jordan (1999) call ‘demosclerosis’, whereby the policy arena has become so overcrowded and unresponsive to changing circumstances that it cannot effectively incorporate demands of pressure groups. For instance, the Organic Foods & Targets Bill proposed by Friends of the Earth (2000) has been suppressed due to pressure from Government whips, and even when EMOs’ Bills become law, they often lack adequate enforcement – as with the Road Traffic Reduction Act of 1997. Contrary to the aims of the Bill, the government has refused to set targets for traffic reduction, and it can be considered as little more than lip-service in the light of the pro-car Ten Year Transport Plan that followed (DfT 2000).

Another problem with the political sociology approach to predicting trajectories of movement activity on the basis of national political systems, is the lack of attention paid to policies and planning decisions that are at least the brainchildren of local political actors, indeed, if they are not decided by them. Local borough councils have considerable weight in local planning matters, and can present themselves as an insurmountable political barrier to local environmental organisations, especially when they have the support of the judiciary system and the Secretary of State, as the Bromley council did, in its support for the Crystal Palace multiplex proposals. Whether it be due to a bottlenecking of issues and action at the national level, or a blocking of the arteries of positive change by a local council, ‘demosclerosis’ - a lack of positive political action on a popular demand - is the net result.

‘Demosclerosis’ is likely to have at least one of two effects; it may make radical organisations highly skeptical of the value of conventional campaigning, widening the gulf between radical and reformist organisations, or it may radicalize reformist groups by triggering realization of the inefficacy of conventional campaigning. The former effect is the more likely outcome of periods of ‘latent’ movement activity, during which conventional environmental organisations are engaged mostly in private discussions and consultations with government ministers, and appear to be increasingly distant from, and ineffective to, the grassroots and/or radical part of the movement. The latter is most likely during critical and ‘visible’ campaign times, which are frequently the result of conventional campaigning failing to deliver the desired outcome.
The trajectory of the environmental movement in the 1990s illustrates these differences between visible and latent times. The end of the 1980s and the early 1990s were a period of latent movement activity, during which there was a huge gulf between the views and activities of radical environmental organisations and their more reformist counterparts. By the time of the Rio Earth Summit (1992), a large swathe of the environmental movement, including environmental organisations that only a few years prior had been regarded as radical – such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth – ‘had lost its critical voice, as states, corporations, and environmental organisations all appeared to share the same language, the same commitments and the same appeal to management as the way to solve environmental problems’ (McNaughten & Urry 1988:65). The language they all spoke was that of sustainable development, a term sufficiently flexible to allow for it to be twisted in favour of economic development by business and government (cf Sachs 1991). This combination of ineffective policy change and apparent incorporation of the environmental movement, led to a perception amongst die-hard activists and radical youth that the mainstream environmental organisations were impotent. The founder members of Earth First! - the direct action network that became (in)famous for its physical, yet resolutely non-violent, opposition to road construction - were motivated by their disillusionment with moderate environmental organisations with which they had previously been involved. Later, direct activists claimed that one reason for their discontent with conventional environmental organisations was because they tended to exclude mass participation. Indeed, the animosity was mutual; Friends of the Earth was initially openly hostile towards direct action networks, actively encouraging its local groups to keep them at a safe distance (Rootes 2002:33).

However, by 1992, the seeds of cooperation between radical and reformist organisations were sewn in the form of the British government’s controversial nationwide road expansion and ‘improvement’ program. This resulted in high levels of public campaigning, mostly beginning with a series of independent conventional local campaigns, with some support from national environmental organisations like Friends of the Earth. Many local campaigning groups fought tirelessly against locally unwanted road expansion projects. Nevertheless, despite their hard slog, the battle against road expansion culminated in 141 lost public inquiries, out of a total of 146 (Must in McKay 1996:128). Activists of all persuasions, witness to a democratic dead-end after losing well-fought public inquiries, were realizing the inefficacy of official channels for halting roads, and began to look for alternative means. One
of the most surprising outcomes was an unexpected alliance between anti-road campaigning groups consisting of folk from Middle England and youth from radical subcultures. At the height of the roads protests, even the highly-reputable Pedestrian’s Association joined ranks with radical anti-roads protesters in order to bounce illegally parked cars off pavements (Jordan & Maloney 1997); its unfruitful battle using conventional protest activities over the previous 66 years appeared much less effectual.

Friends of Earth’s attitude towards direct action had changed considerably – from open hostility, to hospitality. Although Friends of the Earth and the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) both have to consider their political reputation (CPRE especially so), and therefore aim to remain moderate, both can see the virtues of direct action when it remains the only channel open to protesters. De Zylva told the Telegraph that:

> When the normal decision-making methods fail to deliver, it’s time to get off your backside and do something about it. We are very sympathetic to people who take practical action to show up the absurdity of our planning laws (Telegraph Weekend, 28th February 2004).

Even CPRE has displayed sympathy towards direct action protesters campaigning to protect the Nine Ladies megalithic complex and nature conservation site in the Peak District from quarrying. A CPRE spokesperson is recorded as saying that:

> if it weren’t for the eco-warriors, the quarrying would have already started … We applaud them for what they are doing. OK, they might not wash very much and they may look a bit strange, but we have had nothing but cordial relations with them (ibid).

The purpose of this paper is to systematically explore the hypothesis that closed political opportunities in tandem with a critical and highly visible campaign, like those that the anti-roads lobby witnessed in the 1990s, can create dynamic and unexpected alliances between environmental organisations that would, at non-critical and latent times, usually dissociate from, and perhaps even be critical of, one another. In the past, key campaigns in a perceived or objectively closed polity (whether local or national) have brought local, regional and national groups together across ideological divides. This has been witnessed at several junctures in the history of the environmental movement, most notably during campaigns...
against road building (Bryant 1997, North 1997) and airport expansion (Griggs and Howarth 2002). However, to date, there has been no systematic evaluation of the differences between networking at such critical and visible times and during latent periods.

This paper seeks to redress this lack of comparative analyses of movement networks between visible and latent movement times. It is based on a comprehensive survey of environmental organisations in southeast London, conducted at two different points in time. In January 2001, environmental organisations in southeast London were engaged in a huge, visible and critical, campaign against a proposal to build a 20-screen cinema multiplex on Crystal Palace Park. The proposed multiplex had nine bars / diners and retail outlets, but also unsightly ramps leading to a rooftop car park with capacity for 950 cars. Campaigners were concerned not only about the loss of part of this Grade II listed park which is on the English Heritage Register of Historic Parks, but also about the anti-social proposed opening hours, and the additional traffic that it would bring to an already congested and polluted urban area. Almost immediately after the development was proposed, a conventional campaigning outfit, the Crystal Palace Campaign, was established. It sought to use all legal means to challenge this locally unwanted development, including petitions, and a number of legal challenges against Bromley Borough Council’s decision to grant planning permission to the development. It proposed that an alternative development, which it dubbed ‘the Peoples’ Palace’, be built on the site. It wanted this to consist of an ecology and statue park, housing a replica of the original Palace. The ‘People’s Palace’ was supported by the local amenity societies of Dulwich, Sydenham and Croyden, as well as by London Wildlife Trust and Friends of the Earth. Other key groups that were campaigning against the development were the Ridge Wildlife Group, which wanted a nature reserve rather than a People’s Park, and the radical Crystal Palace Protest, which founded the Big Willow Ecovillage. The Big Willow Ecovillage was a direct action camp consisting of occupied tree houses and tunnels to prevent the felling of trees and the manoeuvre of heavy machinery. The purpose of the direct action camp was fourfold: to physically prevent the development from taking place, to support local people (many direct action protesters claimed to be local themselves), to provide valuable media coverage, and to clean up the site which had become a focal point for fly-tippers. In addition, a small group of protesters established an organic vegetable garden.

The network at that point in time is compared with the network as it existed in February 2003. Although southeast London, at that time, hosted the campaign against the
Thames Gateway Bridge, this campaign was not at a critical level. A critical level is reached when the decision to proceed with a LULU (locally unwanted landuse) has been made and construction appears almost imminent. The Crystal Palace Campaign had reached this stage because Bromley Council had granted planning permission, and the eco-villagers were facing impending eviction. In contrast, the Thames Gateway Bridge Campaign was only at the consultation stage. Bates, the coordinator of London Friends of the Earth, confirmed in interview that the Thames Gateway Bridge campaign was at an early stage, was not yet critical, and had yet to mobilize much support, unlike its 1990s predecessor at the height of the Oxleas Wood (anti-road) Campaign of the 1990s: (interview, November 2003):

> Basically that [Oxleas Wood campaign] took a long time to build up. It is only when it gets serious. It was, you know, actually approved. I mean they had to get it revoked as far as I remember… it started off as local and it took ages I think before they really got people involved from … the national organisations … so I don’t think hardly anybody was involved at the early stage then …

Thus the Thames Gateway Bridge campaign was largely invisible, and latent; working on honing its arguments, and developing its networks in preparation for the more visible and critical campaign period that would follow if the battle could not be won through conventional campaigning activity. This meant that the ‘latent’ time lacked a critical campaign. Especially, the absence of the Crystal Palace mobilisation meant that some of the groups no longer considered themselves to be a part of the environmental movement as they now lacked an environmental aim, participation in a network and a collective action foci. Others, such as the Ridge Wildlife Group and Big Willow Ecovillage, had folded. Local amenity societies (such as the Dulwich Society and the Peckham Society), local branches of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, and local Friends of Parks groups were still present in the movement, at the latent time, although they had considerably fewer network links.

2. Methodology

All known and apparently active environmental organisations in southeast London, identified by internet searches, community databases and snowballing with local activists were sent a
questionnaire at these two points in time and were asked to list the top ten environmental organisations with which they collaborate (up to five local organisations and five national organisations). Organisations were only asked to provide network data if they met certain criteria. If they did not have a main aim that was environmental, or did not consider themselves to be part of a network of environmental organisations, no further survey questions were asked of them. Thus all organisations that provided network data claimed to: a) be part of an environmental movement network, b) have a shared concern to protect the environment, and c) were engaged in collective action to achieve environmental improvement/protection, and were therefore part of the environmental movement. The environmental movement, so defined, includes conservationists, whose remit is the protection of nature, reformists, who seek to reform policy in a pragmatic fashion, and radicals, who seek direct change making use of direct action and pre-figurative politics. The networks at these two very different points in time are compared by qualitative analysis of sociograms, and network measures including in- and out-degrees, closeness and betweenness.

3. Movement networking in practice

A component analysis, a necessary preliminary step in social network analysis, shows that the network was considerably less connected in 2003, at a latent time, than it was in 2001, when the critical Crystal Palace Campaign was underway. A component is a group of connected actors (in this case organisations) in which each has at least one network link to others. Organisations that are not in the main, largest, component are relatively isolated from the bulk of the movement. In the 2003 sample, only 31% of the environmental organisations that

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1 Although restricting organisations to listing only their top 10 collaborators might be expected to distort the data, the average in- and out-degrees for all organisations surveyed is less than 10.
2 However, it is certainly the case that the environmental movement overlaps with other movements and realms of civic activity such as the peace movement, leisure/tourism, amenity/architectural protect and others. For a discussion of ‘blurred boundaries’ in the environmental movement, see Saunders 2003.
3 Some scholars (e.g. Doherty 2002) suggest that the schism between conservationist and radical groups is so great that the latter should not be considered part of the ‘green’ movement, mostly because they are not oriented towards social change. Other research by Saunders (2004) shows that the collective identity of conservationists is much weaker than reformist and radical green ideologies. However, it is still fair to view conservationist organisations as part of the movement if they are engaging in collective action, are networked to other environmental organisations and are oriented towards protecting or enhancing the environment. The threat of a locally unwanted land use takes conservationists away from static nature resource enhancement towards networking and real collective action, thus drawing them, albeit temporarily into movement dynamics.
returned completed questionnaires were part of the main component. This stands in stark contrast to the survey conducted during the critical campaign, when 72.1% of nodes were part of the main component. Although the response rate is much lower for the latter survey (38% vs. 62%), opportunities for responding to the questionnaire were virtually equal. This suggests that not only has the network fragmented substantially, but also indicates that a number of organisations that formed specifically to campaign against the development at Crystal Palace folded when the campaign was won in September 2002. Indeed, the volatility and high rates of attrition of local development-specific environmental organisations are well documented (see Rootes et al 2001).

Figure 1 shows all eight components of southeast London’s environmental movement network in January 2003, in the absence of a critical and visible campaign. This can be compared to Figure 2, which shows just the main component of the network in February 2001 during the Crystal Palace Campaign.
During the latent point in time, the once relatively central Crystal Palace Campaign, which did answer a questionnaire but claimed to no longer be part of a network of environmental organisations, was only tangentially linked to the network, being nominated as an important collaborator by only three local societies (Figure 1). In the network in Figure 2, which conveys a moment at which the Crystal Palace Campaign was very active, it was connected to many more organisations with broader remits, including Ridge Wildlife Group, a few societies, national Friends of the Earth, Southwark Friends of the Earth, London Wildlife Trust, RSPB, Southwark Open Spaces Society, Friends of Great North Wood and the Environment Office. In Figure 2, the green nodes represent those organisations that were active in the now ceased Crystal Palace campaign. When these campaigning organisations ceased to exist, and the radical subculture associated with the campaign fell back into latency, the network became considerably more fragmented. The Environment Office was the key broker between the reformist and conservation interests and radical environmentalism and its
DiY culture which features so prominently in the top right hand corner of the network diagram, but which is missing in the more recent network survey. This is because there was no longer a focal point in southeast London for radical protesters in the absence of the Big Willow Ecovillage. What had happened, then, to the radical subculture? A radical activist explained:

Most of them moved into local squats … party squats, reclaim the streets squats. There is a reclaim the streets squat just up the road …I could introduce you to some of them if you like, but they probably wouldn’t want me to, and I don’t think they would answer your questionnaire either, because they are not proper organisations, just a bunch of like-minded people (Storm Porum, radical environmental activist in interview, May 2003).

Clearly these networks had become fragmented, dispersed and invisible to the public eye, and no longer had, or indeed required, the nomenclature that develops during critical movement moments, which is essential both for activists constructing a collective identity, and for researchers seeking to analyse interorganisational linkages. That is not imply that radical activism had become moribund, but rather that it lost its rooted environmental referent. Indeed, there was plenty of evidence in 2003 of a thriving subcultural ‘underground’ party scene, and instances of resistance to evictions of squatted social centres and homes. The act of squatting was seen by activists as part of their struggle to protect the environment from what they regarded to be thousands of unnecessary new-build homes. The difference was that these networks were working more behind the scenes, and were not connected to others via a common campaign. Additionally, they were no longer in the media spotlight.

Although the Crystal Palace Campaign claimed on its website that it ‘did not condone or incite any illegal activity’, there were in practice links between it and the direct action camp. Figure 2 shows indirect links between them via brokers, but more interesting is the fact that the postal address that appeared on the Crystal Palace Campaign Newsletters and the address for donations to the Big Willow Ecovillage were identical. The Boycott UCI campaign also brought together radical and more reformist campaigners together. Boycott UCI involved mass boycotts of UCI cinemas, in an attempt to dissuade the developers from pursuing the development as UCI was planned to be the main leaseholder.
Despite the high degree of networking between environmental organisations at the ‘critical’ campaign time, we should not assume that all of the relationships were consistently cordial. The most prominent campaign organisation, the Crystal Palace Campaign, rigorously pushed for its ‘People’s Park’ alternative, against the wishes of local nature conservationists, who would have much rather preferred to site to become an ecologically oriented nature reserve. And radicals felt sidelined when, in May 2001, the Crystal Palace Campaign held a ‘victory press conference’, which the radicals were not informed about, let alone invited.

Figure 2. Southeast London’s environmental movement network at a ‘critical’ time, February 2001

Key

Key brokers
Organisations campaigning at Crystal Palace

(See Appendix 2 for key to names of organisations)
4. Quantitative network measures

This section of the paper compares quantitative network measures in order to more systematically assess the differences between the movement network at the latent and critical times. The in-degree, out-degree, closeness and betweenness scores are compared for each of the twenty-four environmental organisations that responded to both surveys. Each of these measures are indicators of ‘centrality’; they give an indication of the ‘importance’ of an organisation within a network. Thus, generally speaking, an organisation with a higher centrality score is more important in the network because a higher number of others have rated it as important, or because it performs an important brokerage role.

The simplest and most frequently used indicator of centrality is the ‘in-degree’, which is simply an indicator of popularity; an ‘in-degree’ counts the number of times an organisation has been directly nominated by another as an important collaborator. Although the environmental organisations in both samples were only given the opportunity to list up to ten important collaborators, we can see from Figure 3 that they quite often listed considerably fewer. The most popular organisations, at the critical time, were all heavily engaged in the campaign against Crystal Palace Park – Friends of the Earth had an in-degree of nine, two of its local groups had an in-degree of eight, and the Crystal Palace Park Campaign itself had an in-degree of six. In comparison, in the latent period, the highest in-degree was five. Indeed, a paired samples T-test reveals statistically significant differences (at the 0.18 level) in the means of the in-degrees of the latent and critical samples (Table 1).

It is interesting to note that during the latent period, RSPB (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) was as popular as Friends of the Earth. At the critical time, conservation organisations such as RSBB and the London Wildlife Trust were relatively less prominent. The fact that conservation organisations are concerned with protecting a constant resource, and do not rely on a LULU-type campaign could go someway towards explaining this considerable difference. Flora and fauna is always being conserved in the capital, even in the absence of a critical campaign. The Centre for Wildlife Gardening, which has an in-degree of one in the latent period, does not score at all in the critical period, possibly because its contemporaries were engaged in the political struggle against the multiplex cinema, over and above any desire to conserve ‘background’ wildlife. Although there are many passionate nature lovers, a mere love for (directly) unthreatened nature does not cause environmental
groups to galvanise to the extent that the direct threat posed by an unwanted landuse does. Of course, unwanted land uses also have the potential to disrupt communities, and their ways of life, which may help to explain why they are such great mobilizers.

The ‘out-degree’ is, simply put, an indicator of the ‘gregariousness’ of actors within a network. Rather than indicating the popularity of organisations, it indicates the extent to which an organisation makes itself known to, and contacts, others in the network; it is a measure of the number of nominations an organisation makes rather than receives. Again, we

\[\text{Figure 3. Comparing in-degrees at ‘latent’ and ‘critical’ times}\]

4 This is not to say that wildlife groups are not important. They are certainly highly influential and important agenda setters for the movement. However, it is certainly the case that the average member of a local Wildlife Trust or conservation group will become more politically active in the environmental movement during periods of visibility, when they have something to protect with some urgency (e.g. the felling of 140 mature trees as described on p.18). Conservation work, especially at the local level, more often involves physical management of nature reserves and education than political campaigning.
can note that there is more networking at the critical time compared to the latent one (Figure 4). Environmental organisations are more likely to both seek and receive contact with other organisations when there is a perceived need to unite. At the critical time, the most central organisations under the measure of ‘out-degree’ were, again, mostly primarily concerned with the proposed Crystal Palace development. The Camberwell and Dulwich Societies, which supported the Crystal Palace Campaign both had an out-degree of four at the critical time, and no out-degree whatsoever at the latent time. A paired samples T-test shows that there is a significant (0.11) difference between the means of the out-degree scores at the latent time compared to the critical (Table 1), being almost universally significantly higher in the latter.

However, People Against the River Crossing (PARC), the organisation that formed during the late 1980s-early 1990s Oxleas Wood campaign against a new road that would cross the Thames and carve a path through the ecological haven that is Oxleas Wood, and which was, at the time of data collection, re-embarking upon its campaign against a similar but differently named ‘Thames Gateway Bridge’ had a relatively high out-degree. Although the Thames Gateway Bridge campaign was not at a critical stage, the organisation was clearly seeking to build network links, as we would expect during a latent struggle, as preparation for a possible critical struggle at a later date. Surprisingly, PARC’s out-degree dropped to zero once the Crystal Palace Park campaign had ended. Perhaps PARC was competing with the Crystal Palace Campaign for attention, or else attempting to garner support from those it supposed would be sympathetic to its cause. The Woodlands Farms Trust, which purchased and ecologically farms a patch of land that would have been subsumed by the Oxleas Wood road had the initial anti-road campaign failed, shares a high degree of membership with PARC. Despite this, it was able to maintain its gregariousness during the ‘latent’ period – it did not have a major anti-LULU campaign to compete for attention with, and, rather like nature conservation more generally, is more easily able to be sustained given the lack of an unwanted landuse because its focus is resource conservation rather than protection from an external threat.
‘Betweenness’ (Freeman 1978) or ‘structural holes’ (Burt 1992) measure the extent to which an actor is a network is in a position of control. An organisation that is ‘between’ several other actors in a network has the information and ideas channelled through it, giving it, in theory a ‘gatekeeper’, or ‘brokerage’ role, thus providing it with additional opportunities for
access to information and control. In the ‘latent’ sample, all of the environmental organisations score zero on the betweenness index. This contrasts significantly with the ‘critical’ sample, in which the Friends of the Earth groups and the Crystal Palace Campaign groups and the Dulwich Society have very high betweenness scores (over 100). Thus, it is not surprising to see that the paired samples T-test confirmed a statistically significant difference between the latent and critical scores (Table 1). The environmental organisations in ‘control’ of the network at the ‘critical’ time were very much embedded in the local struggle against the multiplex cinema. At the ‘latent’ time, the absence of a struggle yielded an absence of leadership and power in the network.

In contrast to betweenness, closeness measures how ‘close’ an organisation is to others in the network. In fact, it is better to regard the outcome of the measure of ‘closeness’ as an indicator of the average distance that an organisation is from others, because a higher score is indicative of a greater degree of isolation from the bulk of the network. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find that the distances between organisations was greater during the latent time, yielding considerably higher closeness scores (Figure 5). The case of London Wildlife Trust (LWT) shows why it is important to consider the various measures of centrality in tandem. In the latent network, LWT scored relatively high on its in-degree (Figure 3), suggesting that it was a fairly central actor. However, it has the highest closeness score in the latent sample, suggesting that, despite its popularity, it is at more a distance from the bulk of the network than its contemporaries. Greenwich Friends of the Earth behaves similarly in the network. Yet again, there is a statistically significant difference (0.00) between the latent and critical networks (Table 1)
5. Discussion and conclusion

Even though the Crystal Palace Campaign persevered with conventional campaigning right through to the end of the campaign, local campaigners certainly felt that many of their attempts to thwart the proposed development at Crystal Palace Park were in vain. From the start, back in 1997, campaigners had branded Bromley Borough Council as ‘profit oriented’, and they felt that the local community had been excluded from the decision-making processes. Campaign literature cites that Bromley Borough Council’s emphasis was on ‘attracting developers … to increase any premium from the site’ and therefore it was deemed
the case that ‘the market’ rather than the local community ‘would be allowed to determine the leisure mix’. According to the Crystal Palace Campaign, this resulted in a closure on community involvement. Excluded from all but a ‘token’ consultation, how did the campaign respond? It did not immediately give recourse to direct action, if indeed it ever directly did, but appealed for a public inquiry to challenge the planning proposal. Unfortunately for the campaign, the Secretary of State refused the appeal, after which Bromley Council gave the development outline planning permission. After initially being refused leave, the campaign Chairman, barrister Philip Kolvin eventually instigated an unsuccessful judicial review against the decision to grant planning permission. Still not daunted by the apparent lack of progress in pursuing conventional campaign strategies, the campaign unsuccessfully petitioned the House of Lords in an attempt to reverse the outcome of the judicial review. In January 1999, the Campaign instigated proceedings against Bromley Council in the European Court of Justice, due to its failure to carry out an obligatory Environmental Impact Assessment. It wasn’t until October 2000 that the European Commission sent a formal letter to the British authorities for breeching the EIA Directive prior to granting planning permission, but in the meantime, the campaign had broadened its repertoire, becoming increasingly less conventional. In March 1999 it held a large demonstration in Leicester Square in front of the Empire UCI Cinema, which was followed up with the national Boycott UCI campaign. Local people were encouraged to write to UCI and to phone them out of hours to block up their answer machines with a message saying ‘I don’t want you on our park’. Additionally, the Big Willow Ecovillage was established, silent vigils were held (coordinated by the Ridge Wildlife Group), and public meetings were staged at which the organisations involved could step-up on their networking.

Indeed, it appears that it was only after virtually all feasible legal challenges had been made, or at least commenced, that the Campaign made a significant gear-change towards publicly visible actions that involved considerable networking with other concerned organisations. Although the construction of the multiplex was not imminent because the outcomes of some of the legal challenges were unknown, there were other factors that made the situation appear more critical to local people than it actually was. In January 2001, at the time of data collection for the ‘critical’ network, the campaign had heard rumours that Bromley Borough Council was planning to fell the 140 mature trees that were growing on the ‘ridge’ of the proposed development site. After being bombarded with hundreds of letters
from concerned local people, the leadership of Bromley Borough Council announced in February that they had listened to the people, and would not remove the trees in the ‘immediate future’.

Thus there was both a perception of diminishing, if not closed, political opportunities – a sense of approaching, or having reached a democratic dead end – combined with what was at least perceived as a critical campaign time. This resulted in a multi-faceted affront to Bromley Council’s rumoured decision to fell some locally revered trees, and networking between radical and reformist campaigners. The strategy and the networking would most probably not have materialised had there been other political openings for realising campaign aims, or if there had not been a sense of urgency to halt the development.

In May 2001 Bromley Borough Council announced that it was no longer supporting the proposals for the multiplex, allegedly due to the developer’s failure to complete the lease within the prescribed period. The intense public pressure, legal challenges and the opposition of neighbouring borough councils may also help to explain why Bromley Borough Council was so quick to drop the proposals that it had previously defended so rigorously. The campaign slowly drifted from the public eye over the next few months, to the extent that by January 2003 it was engaged mostly in dialogue workshops and committees with Bromley Borough Council, the Government Office for London, and the Mayor of London. The result of its latency was fragmentation of the local environmental movement network, which no longer had a visible campaign to attach itself to, or a development that it perceived to be in need of urgent opposition. The radical activists that were involved in the eco-village dispersed into small unnamed groups of squatters, conservation organisations became relatively more important than single-issue protest groups, and all of the key organisations became less well-connected – they reduced their gregariousness, popularity and brokerage roles significantly. There is some evidence during the latent point in time of ‘meaning construction work’. For radical activists, their squatting was a form of resistance against new-build housing, which had, as Melucci (1989:70-1) predicted involved the ‘sewing [of] opposition into the very fabric of [their] lives’. For the less radical activists involved in the Crystal Palace Campaign, dialogue and consultations with the council became a mundane and publicly invisible but important part of their lives.

Network analysis has helped to demonstrate the quite stark differences that we can expect to find as local environmental movement networks develop and evolve over time.
Most importantly, this paper has illustrated that environmental organisations are significantly better networked when political opportunities are perceived as closed, and when a campaign appears to have reached a critical stage. These two conditions result in visible movement activity, which makes it easier for environmental organisations not only to contact one another, but to have opportunities for collaborative campaigning. Thus, networking is not only an important precursor to effective environmental movement action, but is also an outcome of it. Perhaps it was the degree of networking that made the Crystal Palace Campaign such a pervasive and persuasive political force, and this might well have been the real reason why Bromley Borough Council decided suddenly to drop the multiplex proposal in May 2001.

This research has showed how local environmental movement networks at critical campaign times manifest as broad coalitions embracing conservationists, reformists and radicals. Thus, it may be tempting to suggest that such a phenomenon – the social movement dynamic – is specific to critical stages of campaigns rather than the basis of broader and durable intra-movement networking, and therefore to suggest that southeast London’s environmentalism represents a series of coalition dynamics rather than a social movement dynamic. However, a conservationist organisation, London Wildlife Trust, was the most central environmental organisation in the collaboration network at the latent time despite having low levels of resources and not being actively involved in site battles or critical campaigns. This means that we can neither exclude conservationists from the movement, nor say that the ‘movement’ only exists at critical campaign times. Even in the absence of the critical campaign, there would be links at the very least between conservationists and reformists, and between radicals and reformists. And even when temporary instrumental coalitions fold, latent links remain and can be drawn upon for later campaign episodes. This has happened with the network links that evolved during the anti-roads movement. These networks have recently been revived for aviation campaigning through the Airport Watch coalition. Further, it is clearly wrong to assume that all coalitions and site-battle networks are short-lived and have no bearing on a movement’s future. The Ilusi Dam campaign members turned their attention to the Baku Ceyhan Campaign after they had won the former campaign, and have since become members of the No New Oil coalition. This shows that the coalition networks that develop during the course of a single campaign are durable beyond the life of a single campaign, and can therefore be considered part of a movement. Even though there is
much less networking at latent times, we could suggest, as Rootes (2004a:611) argues on a
grander scale for Western Europe, that in London there is indeed ‘sufficient engagement in
collective action and sufficient shared concern to warrant continued use of the term
“environmental movement”.

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Networks*, 1, pp.215-239.
pp.314-328.


Appendix 1

Key to Figure 1

1 Bankside Open Spaces Trust
2 BTCV
3 Badair
4 BromleyRSPB
5 Crystal Palace Campagin
6 CPRE
7 Camberwell Society
8 Centre for Wildlife Gardening
9 Creekside Forum
10 Dog Kennel Hill Campagin
11 Dulwich Society
12 East Dulwich Society
13 Encams (previously Tidy Britain
14 Forum of Conservation and Amenity Societies
15 Friends of the Earth
16 Federation of City Farms
17 Forum for Stable Currencies
18 Friends of Belaiv Park
19 Friends of Burgess Park
20 Friends of Dulwich Park
21 Friends of Greenwich Park
22 Friends of Jubilee Gardens
23 Greenwich Action to Stop Pollution
24 Greenwich Wildlife Advisory Group
25 Greenwich Conservation Group
26 Greenwich Friends of the Earth
27 Greenwich Greenpeace
28 Greenwich Wildlife Trust
29 Groundwork
30 Groundwork London
31 Groundwork Southwark
32 London Wildlife Trust
33 Learning Through Landscapes
34 Lee Manor Society
35 People Against the River Crossing
36 PCEG
37 Peckham Society
38 RSPB
39 Roots and Shoots
40 Southwark Friends of the Earth
41 Sustainable Energy Action
42 Southwark Social Investment Forum
43 Vauxhall Society
44 Vision for Vauxhall
45 Walk First
46 Walworth Garden Farm
47 Waste Watch
48 Woodlands Farm Trust
Appendix 2.

Key to Figure 2.

1. 56a
2. Alarm
3. Anti-Terrorism Act
4. Archway Alert
5. Association for Monetary Reform
6. BADAIR
7. Barrydale Allotments Association
8. British Horse Society
9. Blackheath Society
10. Boycott UCI
11. Brixton Greenpeace
12. Brockley Society
13. Brockley Cross Action Group
14. Bromley Greenpeace
15. BTCV
16. Camberwell Society
17. CAST
18. Centre for Alternative Technology
19. Charlton Society
20. Chernobyl Children
22. Civic Trust
23. CND
24. Corporate Watch
25. Countryside Agency
26. Crystal Palace Campaign
27. Crystal Palace Foundation
28. Crystal Palace Protest
29. Cyclists Tourist Club
30. Dog Kennel Hill Society
31. Dulwich Society
32. East Dulwich Society
33. Ecotri[p
34. Earth First!
35. Eltham Society
36. English Heritage
37. Environment Office
38. Fareshares
39. Friends of Burgess Park
40. Friends of Camberwell Park
41. Friends of Dawson’s Hill
42. Friends of Dulwich Park
43. Federation of City Farms
44. Friends of Great North Wood
45. Flora and Fauna
46. Friends of Nunhead Cemetery
47. Friends of the Earth
48. Forum for the Future
49. Friends of Peckham Rye Park
50. Friends of Beckenham Park
51. Greenwich Action Plan
52. Greenwich Action to Stop Pollution
53. Gene Concern
54. Georgian Group
55. Green Party
56. Green Anarchist
57. Green Lanes
58. Greenpeace
59. Greenwich Conservation Group
60. Greenwich Cyclists
61. Greenwich Environment Forum
62. Greenwich Friends of the Earth
63. Greenwich Green Party
64. Greenwich Greenpeace
65. Greenwich Local History Society
66. Greenwich LA21
67. Greenwich Society
68. Greenwich Wildlife Advisory Group
69. Hastings Bypass Campaign
70. Hillyfields Action Group
71. Huntington Life Sciences Campaign
72. Justice?
73. Lambeth Cyclists
74. Lambeth Environment Forum
75. Lambeth Green Party
76. Lambethians Society
77. Lambeth Transport Users Group
78. Lambeth Walk First
79. Lambeth Local History Society
80. London Cycling Campaign
81. Legal Defence and Monitoring Group
82. Lee Manor Society
83. Lettsom Gardens Association
84. Lewisham Cyclists
85. Lewisham Environment Trust
86. Lewisham Green Party
87. Lewisham Pedestrians Association
88. Lewisham Wildlife Trust
89. London Forum of Amenity Societies
90. London Forum of Green Parties
91. Liberty
92. London Natural History Society
93. London Anarchy
94. London SCARE
95. London Walking Forum
96. London RSPB
97. London Wildlife Trust
98. May Day Collective
99. MedACT
100. Greenwich Sustainable Millenium Network
101. Minet Conservation Association
102. Monetary Justice
103. New Economics Foundation
104. Norwood Society
105. People Against the River Crossing
106. PCEG
107. Peace camps
108. Peckham Society
109. Pedestrians Association (now Living Streets)
110. Pirate TV
111. Plant Life
112. Primal Seeds
113. Quaggy Waterways Action Group
114. Residents Association [unspecified]
115. Rail Passengers and Commuters Association (SE)
116. Ridge Wildlife Group
117. Road Peace
118. Rockingham Estates Play Area
119. Royal Society for Nature Conservation
120. RSPB
121. RTS
122. SAVE
123. SchNEWS
124. South East London World Development Movement

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157. Undercurrents
158. Urban 75
159. Victorian Society
160. World Development Movement
161. Wildlife Gardening Initiative
162. Wombles
163. Woodlands Farm Trust

Endnotes

i This paper draws on surveys conducted as part of two different projects: the Transformation of Environmental Activism Project, funded by the EC Environment and Climate Research Programme, contract number ENV4-CT97-0514, and an ESRC-postgraduate training award, number R42200134447.

ii By British exceptionalism, Rootes (1992) was referring to the (then) exceptionally moderate character of British Environmental organisations in comparison to other Western democracies.

iii The top seven brokers, calculated using Freeman’s betweenness (1979) all have scores well-exceeding ten. The eighth highest broker has a score lower than four. In January 2003, not one organisation’s brokerage score exceeds 8.

iv For a comprehensive yet concise introduction to social network methods, please see Scott (2000).

v See the Crystal Palace Campaign website for an in-depth history of the Campaign. (http://www.crystal.dircon.co.uk/ accessed 15/03/03, 20/05/06).